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JUDGING SCIENCE: AN ESSAY ON THE
UNSCIENTIFIC BASIS OF BELIEFS ABOUT
THE IMPACT OF LEGAL RULES ON
SCIENCE AND THE NEED FOR BETTER
DATA ABOUT LAW
Gillian K. Hadfield*
INTRODUCTION
There’s a simple maxim: practice what you preach. Most of us
have difficulty taking advice from—even worse submitting to the
authority of—those who fail to abide by this maxim. This may
explain, at least in part, the tensions between those in the scientific
community and those in law. Law sits in judgment of science and
scientific method in many settings, including adjudicating
scientific evidence about hazard rates or toxicity, regulating
standards of care in medicine, and assessing the qualifications of
scientific expert witnesses and their compliance with scientific
method. Ironically, however, those who propound legal
conclusions about science could rarely meet the standards imposed
on science. The legal system—judges, legal scholars, lawyers and
legal policymakers—has to date shown very little interest in
systematic, scientific assessment of how the legal system itself
operates. Our data are poor and our models are few.1 Small
*

Professor of Law, University of Southern California Gould School of Law.
My thanks to Steven Lauridsen for excellent research assistance.
1
See N. William Hines, Empirical Scholarship: What Should We Study and
How Should We Study It?, ASSOC. AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS PRESIDENT AND
THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA, http://www.aals.org/am2006/theme.html (describing
the theme for the upcoming 2006 annual meeting). See also Elizabeth Warren,
The Market for Data: The Changing Role of Social Sciences in Shaping the Law,
2002 WIS. L. REV. 1, 2 n.2 (2002) (citing several works over the last decade
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wonder, perhaps, that serious scientists chafe under the scientific
requirements imposed on them by lawyers.
Nonetheless, the questions we have about the impact of the
legal system—not the substance of legal rules per se, but the
practices and policies of how legal procedures are implemented
(with ultimate effects on substantive legal rules) by judges, courts,
and legal service providers—on the practice and application of
science are myriad. They include:
• Is the cost of science-based litigation discouraging important
litigation?
• Is Daubert2 leading to better legal decisions involving
scientific evidence?
• Is the deterrence effect of (tort) law being diminished by
Daubert?
• Is the deterrence effect of (tort) law being diminished by a
policy in favor of settlement?
• Are “secret settlements” and sealed case files leading to
increased risks of injury/inadequate deterrence?
• Is the increasing emphasis on costly scientific expertise
creating an asymmetry between corporate and individual
litigants?
• Are legal rules regarding the admissibility and sufficiency of
evidence discouraging scientific research by corporations?
• Are corporate defendants succeeding in shifting legal
calling for more empirical legal research). Compare Dennis M. Patterson, The
Limits of Empiricism: What Facts Tell Us, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2738, 2738 (2000)
(“The conventional legal academic wisdom about empiricism is that empirical
information is by-and-large a good thing, that we need more of it, and that
empirical analysis is preferable to many scholarly alternatives now on offer in
law review literature.”), with William M. Landes, The Empirical Side of Law
and Economics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 167, 180 (2003) (“[E]mpirical work does not
occupy an exalted place at law schools. It would only be a modest exaggeration
to say that most law professors regard empirical work as a form of drudgery not
worthy of first-class minds. In the legal academic pecking order, empirical
research does not rank as high as theory. This translates into a downward shift in
the demand for empirical relative to theoretical scholarship in law economics.”).
2
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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standards on summary judgment and motions to dismiss to
thus keep individual plaintiffs away from juries?
These are important questions about the design features of our
legal system. Many attributes can to some extent be manipulated
by judges, court administrators, and lawyers, in order to improve
the quality of outcomes produced by the legal system. These
attributes include:
• Standards and procedures for the admissibility of expert
evidence
• Rules of evidence
• Standards for summary judgment and motions to dismiss
• The use and interpretation of risk assessments
• The use of neutral or partisan experts
• The participation of courts in sealing and enforcing secret
settlements
• The use of protective orders to limit access to information
gleaned through discovery
• The rules for the distribution of legal costs
• The rules governing class actions, including jurisdiction,
attorneys fees, and class certification
The pros and cons of different attributes (e.g., whether the
standard for admitting expert evidence should be higher or lower,
or whether courts should agree to keep data developed in discovery
under seal) are heavily debated in law. Often the arguments are
empirically-based and predictive, such as: raising the standard for
admitting expert evidence will reduce the likelihood of “Junk
science” in the courtroom,3 and secret settlements are essential to
promote the production of data in discovery.4 And yet, the legal
profession as a whole pays relatively little attention to the careful
3

See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1991).
4
See, e.g., Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of
Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283
(1999).
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evaluation of these empirical claims. Law studies the impact of
itself on the outcomes it intends to produce sporadically or not at
all. There is no structural equivalent to the “public health” or
epidemiology frameworks we find in medicine, according to which
some members of the medical profession devote their efforts to
evaluating health care as a whole and tracking the relationship
between systems of prevention, diagnosis, and treatment on the
one hand and the health and wellness outcomes we care about on
the other. Law, as a system of courts, government agencies,
lawyers, and legal scholars, has no institutional arm devoted to
careful study of the question of how well the legal system performs
in achieving its goals. In the area of science, law plays a large
regulatory role: influencing the investments in and standards for
clinical trials for pharmaceuticals, or the development of safety
mechanisms in cars, or the scientific requirements that must be met
to avoid and prevent infringement on patented procedures,
equipment, or materials. In spite of this role the question of how
well the legal system regulates science is not systematically
addressed in a scientific manner by assessing data, testing
hypotheses, and evaluating alternatives.
In Part I of this essay, I discuss the problems of data collection
in the legal system. In Part II, I examine the impact of these data
problems on our knowledge about a particular fact about the legal
system, namely the frequency with which matters actually go to
trial. I report in this Part results from a study I have done of the
reliability of the available data about the “vanishing trial” that
demonstrates the difficulty we face in understanding the
determinants of even this basic attribute of our legal system.
Finally, I offer some conclusions.
I. PROBLEMS IN DATA COLLECTION
The problem begins at the very first step in any evidence-based
system of knowledge: the collection of data. There are few legal
institutions devoted to the collection of data about the legal system,
and essentially none are charged with collecting data for the
purposes of evaluating the impact of legal rules and practices on
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outcomes. As I will discuss in detail below, the data about the legal
system are frequently unreliable and easily misinterpreted. Often
data are collected sporadically, disrupting our ability to judge over
time how variables are changing. Coding practices shift over time,
also making longitudinal comparisons difficult if not impossible.
What information is collected about law, particularly through
discovery in individual cases, is frequently very difficult to access.
A large and highly variable percentage of case opinions remain
unpublished, further skewing the analysis of even the small
fraction that result in an opinion.5
One of the most significant sources of inadequacy in our data
about law rests in the norms and practices related to confidentiality
in the legal system. Protective orders sealing document records are
routine in litigation involving corporations.6 Final case outcomes
in a large percentage of cases involve a private settlement that is
itself sealed and that imposes non-disclosure requirements on those
privy to its contents.7 Moreover, the centrality of confidentiality to
the attorney-client relationship means that very little information
about what lawyers do, what they charge, what issues they face,
and what choices they make, ever becomes available for study.
Advocacy is defined as the start and the end of the attorney-client
relationship, again reflecting the absence of a “public health”
perspective on the workings of the legal system. Medical
professionals similarly face issues of confidentiality and loyalty to
the well-being of their patients, but they also adopt a stance that is
curious about and committed to the scientific assessment of how
well prevention, diagnosis and treatment methods, in the
aggregate, are working.8 Medicine, through professional practices
of sharing case-related information with colleagues and
researchers, and sometimes subject to legal regulation of
5

Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 202-03 (1998).
6
See Dore, supra note 4, at 324-32.
7
See id. at 384.
8
See, e.g., Gregory E. Simon et al., Large Medical Databases, PopulationBased Research, and Patient Confidentiality, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1731,
1731 (2000).
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disclosures, manages to maintain confidentiality for patients
without losing the valuable data content of what their work with
patients reveals. Not so with legal professionals. Data about cases
are rarely shared with researchers, even in anonymous fashion.
This all adds up to a stunning lack of information about how
one of the most central institutions of our market democracy
functions in fact, and leaves almost nowhere to turn for answers to
the questions we have about how well the system operates to
regulate the other central institutions such as medicine and the
corporation. We know essentially nothing about how alternative
dispute resolution systems work, because most often, once a case is
diverted into private dispute resolution, almost no information
emerges for public analysis.9 Similarly, there are limited public
data available about the cost of legal services. The U.S. Census
collects and reports annual data about total receipts in law firms,10
allowing some measure of the “size” of the legal system; but these
data do not include expenditures on legal services provided by
employed lawyers: corporate in-house legal departments or
government lawyers. There are separate data available on public
expenditures on courts and government attorneys involved in the
civil and criminal justice systems, provided by the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, but it excludes government-employed legal
departments that are not affiliated with the activities of the justice
system, such as legal counsel providing governments with services
related to government contracting or employment.11 The Bureau of
9

There are a few limited exceptions. The National Association of
Securities Dealers publishes arbitration awards in securities disputes. See
Securities Arbitration Commentor, http://www.sacarbitration.com (last visited
Oct. 27, 2005). AAA employment arbitration awards have been available since
1999. See American Arbitration Association, http://www.adr.org/AAAawards/
(last visited Oct. 27, 2005).
10
2002 COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS AND 2002 ECONOMIC CENSUS,
NUMBER OF FIRMS, NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS, EMPLOYMENT, ANNUAL
PAYROLL, AND RECEIPTS BY RECEIPT SIZE OF THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE UNITED
STATES, ALL INDUSTRIES 2002, http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/ usalli_r02.xls.
11
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, JUSTICE EXPENDITURES AND
EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2001 (May 2004), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/jeeus01.pdf.
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Labor Statistics collects information about wages and hours in law
firms, but only for non-supervisory employees, a category that
excludes most lawyers.12
Privately, consulting firms, most notably Altman-Weil,
conduct voluntary surveys of lawyers and law firms, collecting a
wide variety of information—such as hourly rates, billable hours,
total receipts, expenditures on paralegals—for purposes of selling
the data, and business advice, to law firms and lawyers.13 The
sample, beginning in 1985, is one of the only longitudinal and
national data sets on billing rates of which I am aware, and its
value as a dataset has yet to be exploited by researchers. However,
this value is limited by two factors: first, it is self-selected and
therefore concentrated on Altman-Weil clients and hence not
necessarily representative; and second, it is available to the public
only in aggregate descriptive tables, rather than on the firm-byfirm or lawyer-by-lawyer basis necessary to perform statistical
tests of correlation and causation. Cost data, which would be
especially relevant to many of the questions we have about the
courts and science, including data about experts and other
expenditures on discovery and trial preparation, are currently nonexistent in public form.
It is important to emphasize that the problem is not that these
data on legal costs are not collected and retained; it is that the
collection and retention is done by private firms and rarely made
public, even in anonymous fashion. Indeed, as pressures to rein in
legal costs have burgeoned in recent years, purchasers of legal
services have turned to data collection and analysis for insights and
mechanisms for cost control.14 Auditors are available to analyze
12

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGES BY AREA

AND OCCUPATION, http://www.bls.gov/bls/blswage.htm.
13

ALTMAN WEIL, INC., SURVEY OF LAW FIRM ECONOMICS,
http://www.altmanweil.com/products/ surveys/slfe.cfm.
14
See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers
Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957-58 (2000). See, e.g.,
TECUM, Inc., Is Your Law Firm Saving or Costing You?,
http://www.tecuminc.com (last visited Oct. 27, 2005) (providing consulting and
analysis services for the “control of litigation costs”).
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the accumulated legal bills received by their clients.15 On a large
scale, the insurance industry has managed to significantly reduce
its expenditures on legal fees and case settlements over the past
two decades by mining the data it accumulates about claims, costs
and payouts. The industry has thus been able to auction off blocks
of business for fixed fees, a cost-internalization mechanism made
possible by the systematic analysis, and sharing, of claim history
and the identification of factors that can be used to predict the cost
of litigating and settling claims.16 These data, however, are
generally hoarded and not made publicly available. Insurance
information is only sporadically released for study by government
agencies that track such data. Incomplete and sporadic data such as
this, while still valuable, often lacks continuity and comparability
and the information needed to assess representativeness. More
importantly, the data generally do not contain detailed information
about the legal procedures and practices that played a role in
determining the outcome.
As one might expect, data about public courts and their
activities are more easily available for research and analysis.
Keeping track of procedures and rulings in court is a fundamental
feature of case management and a primary task of court clerks who
maintain docket sheets for each case. Recently, electronic access to
court dockets has become available throughout the federal courts,
using the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER)
system, which provides litigants and researchers with the ability to
review the docket online and, in some cases, view case
documents.17 Data from this source are an important new resource
for studies of the legal system, albeit one that allows a researcher
to go back in time only to the late 1990s. This data source,
however, suffers from an important shortcoming. One of the key
variables in case analysis is the nature of the suit—such as product
15

See, e.g, TECUM, Inc., supra note 14. See also ZURICH, LITIGATION
MANAGEMENT, http://www.zurichna.com/zus/onlineservices.nsf/0/2d5debbbff
deb1ad85256c6800664ff9?OpenDocument.
16
See ZURICH, supra note 15.
17
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, PACER Service Center,
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/.
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liability, securities, civil rights—and many larger cases involve
multiple areas of the law. Cases in PACER dockets, however, are
coded for a single type, even when cases involve multiple causes
of action. In addition, the nature of suit coding is based on
whatever the plaintiff, her attorney or paralegal indicated as “the”
cause of action on the cover sheet she filled in when she filed the
case. The reliability of this categorization for research purposes is
an open question.
For longer term analysis, the most comprehensive database on
the work of courts is collected by the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts (AO) and compiled for analysis by the Federal Judicial
Center. These data report on many aspects of bankruptcy, civil and
criminal trials and appeals, and in various forms go back several
decades. Data are on a case-by-base basis, giving the names of the
first-named plaintiff and defendant, the nature of suit, the court in
which the case was heard, the dates of filing and termination, the
procedural progress of the case at the time of termination, the
means of termination, whether the action is filed as a class action,
the amounts demanded and awarded, and so on. Much of the data
are available in reported aggregated form from the AO in a set of
annual tables going back as early as the 1960s. Of even greater
value to researchers, the data are available electronically on a caseby-case basis going back to 1970 and can be downloaded from a
publicly available website.18 These data, however, cover only some
2% of all litigation as the vast majority of litigation takes place in
state court and does not involve the federal system.
Data on state courts are decidedly less comprehensive.
Although the National Center for State Courts has a number of
programs devoted to collecting data from all state courts, the sheer
number of state systems and the autonomy of these systems in
terms of recordkeeping mean that comparable data are difficult to
assemble. Caseload, meaning total filing, data are available for all
courts.19 The greatest effort to collect more detailed data, the Civil
18

ICPSR: INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
RESEARCH, http://www.icpsr.org.
19
NCSC: NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, COURT STATISTICS
PROJECT, http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/CSP_Main_Page.html.
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Justice Survey of State Courts, involves a sample of tort, property
and contract cases in 45 jurisdictions representing the 75 most
populous counties in the country. Data on the outcomes including
who prevailed, in what amount and the duration of the litigation, in
trials have been collected for 1992 (jury trials only), 1996 and
2001.20 Although these data include some very helpful information
not collected in the federal database—particularly the nature of the
plaintiff and defendant whether individual, government or
business—data about non-trial outcomes were only collected in
1992. The subsequent restriction to completed trials misses a large
component of court and litigation activity of prime interest to
researchers, namely the disposition of cases in non-trial methods
such as settlement, summary judgments and court-ordered
dismissals.
Other researcher-collected databases exist. Two of the most
notable are the RAND data on civil jury trials in 15 jurisdictions
from 1985-1994 and the RAND data on tort jury verdicts in San
Francisco and Cook counties spanning a 40-year period.21
However, by focusing only on completed jury trials, such datasets
limit our look into the conduct of courts and the decisions courts,
judges, lawyers and litigants make in processing a case. Moreover,
datasets collected by individual researchers tend to be, given the
tremendously labor-intensive process of reviewing case files,
rather limited in scope—focusing only one type of case (i.e., class
actions, asbestos cases), or a limited number of jurisdictions or a
single time period. The more finely tuned the study is to a
particular feature of the legal system—the use of Daubert, the cost
of legal services, the invocation of the policy in favor of
settlement—the more limited the scope of the dataset is likely to
be.
20

The data for 1996 can be analyzed in a helpful online “query” system.
Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clemont, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL,
http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questata.htm.
21
RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS:
NEW DATA FROM 15 JURISDICTIONS, http://www.rand.org/publications/
RB/RB9025/RB9025.html; Seth A. Seabury et al., Forty Years of Civil Jury
Verdicts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004).
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The problems in obtaining the data necessary for systematic
and statistically sound descriptions and predictions about how
various aspects of the legal system impact the use and practice of
science go beyond the fact that limited data are collected.
Unfortunately, even the data that we have are sometimes
unreliable, at least insofar as they can be easily misinterpreted by
researchers. To demonstrate this point, I now turn to a more
detailed discussion of the difficulties I have discovered in the most
extensive and comprehensive database about litigation that we
have, the federal civil trials termination data, and the problems
these data present in reaching conclusions about a basic feature of
our legal system, namely the question of whether cases today are
more or less likely to end in a trial as opposed to a settlement or a
non-trial adjudication, and if so, what might explain such a trend.
II. A CASE IN POINT: THE VANISHING TRIAL
It is clear to anyone involved in the legal system that many
things have changed in the system in the past three decades.
Caseloads have increased dramatically, significant efforts to
promote settlement and alternative dispute resolution have become
institutionalized, and litigation has become increasingly dominated
by discovery and motion practice. There have also been
substantial, not unrelated, changes in legal doctrine. In federal
courts, for instance, the standards for surviving summary judgment
have, by some accounts, been significantly tightened22 and the
reach of the Federal Arbitration Act, which requires states to
strictly enforce arbitration clauses even in standardized consumer
and employment contracts, has been extended by the U.S. Supreme
Court.23 In addition, legal practice has become increasingly
specialized and high-priced, and the size of law firms has

22

See Arthur Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in
Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 984, 1006, 1016
(2003).
23
See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
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exploded.24 In the wake of these changes, a question has emerged:
Is the trial disappearing from our legal system? It would seem that
this should be a basic question with a straightforward answer. But
the great difficulty in answering this question is a testament to the
problems facing the availability and use of data about the legal
system.
A. The Trouble With Numbers
The first place to look for the answer is the data published by
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, specifically the “C-4”
tables in the Report of the Director that provide annual figures for
the percentage of cases reaching trial. Marc Galanter recently
observed from these tables that, whereas in 1962 a full 11.5% of all
federal cases reached trial, in 2001, only 1.8% did.25 This appears
to be a stunning drop and clearly evidence of the fact that trials are
vanishing from federal courtrooms. It confirms for many their
anecdotal experience: the judge who hears only one or two trials a
year; the court administrator who looks out on dark courtrooms;
the trial lawyer who no longer goes to trial. As a phenomenon, it
triggers a host of questions about causation. Is the drop a result of
the increasing cost of litigation, fueled by increasingly expensive
and specialized lawyering, extensive discovery, and heavy use of
high-cost experts? Is it evidence of tort reform in disguise and the
erosion of the role of the jury in the American legal system? Is the
disappearance of the trial a result of the success of the alternative
dispute resolution movement and judicial hostility towards trial? Is
the phenomenon related to an increasingly pro-defendant or procorporate judiciary? Is it part and parcel of a clawing back of the
rights created by the revolutions in civil rights and tort law that
took place in the 1960’s and 70’s?26 Does the elimination of the
24

See JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL, URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 12, 37 (2005).
25
Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459,
459 (2004) (noting a 60% decline in the number of trials from 1962 to 2002).
26
Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary,
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trial reflect the “privatization” of litigation, with the resulting loss
of public access to information and the public good of law
developed through precedent? Does the diminished likelihood of
trial imply a reduction in the deterrence effect of law?
These are “scientific” questions about law: about the frequency
of a phenomenon, its causes and possible cures. If these questions
were asked about safety mechanisms in a piece of machinery or
about the medical care someone received, the law would require
that scientific testimony about frequency, causation and cure be
adequately rooted in scientific method, meeting the standards for
professional engineers or medicine or statisticians including valid
inferences and reliable proof:
[I]n order to qualify as “scientific knowledge,” an inference
or assertion must be derived by the scientific method.
Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate
validation – i.e., “good grounds,” based on what is
known. . . . [A] key question to be answered in determining
whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that
will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has
been) tested. . . . [I]n the case of a particular scientific
technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known
or potential rate of error.27
Applying those same standards to our observations about the
vanishing trial reveals just how little we know, in fact, about what
is happening in even this most basic attribute of our legal system.
Without those answers, it is difficult to know whether the
vanishing trial is a good or a bad phenomenon. If trials are
disappearing from the resolution of commercial contract disputes,
that may be all for the good, if it reflects the rationalization of
commercial disputes and a reduction in the cost of litigating. For
these litigants, there may be little value to be gained from a thirdparty public determination of their conflict. On the other hand, if
trials are disappearing from the claims made by individual citizens
against large organizations—under the civil rights or tort laws—
Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003).
27
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590, 593-94 (1993).
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then the loss of the trial may be indicative of other democratic
losses, both for the individuals involved and for the public.
Certainly, we cannot begin to remedy any change we judge to be
undesirable without knowing, in fact, what is happening and then,
from that, why.
Recently, I “unpacked” the available data about the frequency
of trials in federal court and discovered that we have a long way to
go before we can reliably say whether or not the likelihood of trials
(and which trials) has fallen over the past several decades, and
even further before we can reliably say what might be causing that
fall. There are four fundamental difficulties in interpreting the
basic statistics reported by the AO: first, the data relate to a
different population of cases than the group we are primarily
interested in; second, the data are produced by a coding system that
is not mutually exclusive and exhaustive; third, the coding system
has changed over time; and fourth, there are errors in the coding. I
take up these problems in turn.
1. What’s In The Denominator?
The AO has consistently used the same criteria to measure the
trial rate over the years it has been producing the C-4 tables: the
number of cases that had reached the trial stage when they were
terminated divided by the total number of cases terminated in a
given year. This, as Galanter notes, is theoretically an
overstatement of the trial rate because it includes cases that settle
after trial has begun.28 That overstatement, of course, makes the
observation of the vanishing trial a conservative one: things,
according to this number, are even worse than they appear if we
are interested in the percentage of cases that are litigated to a
decision by bench or jury. As such, we see an overstatement of the
numerator in the reported trial rate.
The real difficulty in interpreting the trial rate reported in the
AO’s tables, however, comes from the denominator. It sounds
appropriate enough: all terminated cases. However, a case is
28

See Galanter, supra note 25, at 461 n.4.
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“terminated” in the federal court data system whenever it leaves
the district in which it was filed, however it leaves that district.
Thus terminations include cases that are transferred to other
districts or remanded to a state court or an agency. It includes cases
that are withdrawn without prejudice and ready to be filed
elsewhere if the plaintiff so chooses. It also includes cases that go
on hiatus: stayed pending a bankruptcy proceeding or closed
“statistically” due to inactivity, ready to be re-activated if need be.
Thus, the denominator includes non-final results. This is important
for two reasons. First, when interpreting the trial rate as the
likelihood a case proceeds to trial rather than being settled or
adjudicated (such as by summary judgment) without a trial, we are
assuming the rate is the percentage of cases proceeding trial as a
fraction of all final case outcomes. Although court administrators,
at the district level, are very interested in what percentage of all the
cases coming through their doors make it to trial, because that tells
them how to interpret their filing data in terms of courtroom
workload, analysts of the legal system are not generally interested
in what percentage of all cases filed in a particular district went to
trial; they want to know how frequently a decision was made by
trial rather than agreement or dispositive motion.
The second reason that the fact that the denominator of the C-4
trial rate29 includes non-final dispositions is important is that it is
entirely possible for this trial rate to drop without any change at all
in the likelihood that a case goes to trial. This can happen if the
number of non-final terminations in a district increases, from an
increase in transfers or remands, for example, or from an increase
in the withdrawal of cases without prejudice.
There is another aspect of the denominator of the statistic
reported in the C-4 tables that is misleading for analysts who want
to interpret this statistic as the likelihood that a case goes to trial as
opposed to being settled or adjudicated without a trial by motion.
This is not a problem of how the statistic is defined, but of the way
29

I want to emphasize that the AO does not call this a “trial rate.” They,
quite accurately, refer to it in the C-4 tables as “percent reaching trial.” The
interpretation of this statistic as a trial is something that researchers impose on
it.
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in which the statistic reflects a population of cases that does not
match the case analysts generally have in mind. The federal
statistic includes all cases filed (and hence terminated) in federal
court. This includes a very large number of cases that are dealt
with in largely administrative fashion, often uncontested or only
minimally contested. These cases include prisoner petitions, which
often raise habeas corpus and civil rights claims or challenges to
prison conditions, and actions by the federal government to collect
on unpaid student loans. These two categories of cases are a large
fraction of all federal cases and a fraction that grew substantially
over the last three decades: together, prisoner petitions and student
loan recovery actions accounted for 20% of all federal cases in
1970; that number had grown to 30% by 2000.30 This fact is
important for two related reasons.
First, prisoner petitions are overwhelmingly treated in an
administrative fashion: they are generally filed pro se and in forma
pauperis, and just as generally dismissed summarily, either
because the petition to file in forma pauperis is denied or because
the allegations are facially without merit. Student loan recovery
actions are also routinely dealt with in administrative fashion, not
because they are without merit but because they are largely
uncontested and default judgments are entered. Neither of these
types of litigation are representative of the type of “ordinary” civil
litigation that analysts have in mind when they interpret the AO’s
reported trial rates. Both of these classes of cases are essentially
uncontested and do not tell us about the attributes of the ordinary
litigation that motivates the trial rate inquiry; they don’t tell us
whether plaintiffs are facing financial barriers to full trials, or
whether efforts at alternative dispute resolution are succeeding or
whether early summary judgment motions are weeding out more
cases. Of course, this will also be true of numerous cases in other
case categories. But the sheer size of these two categories has the
potential to skew our interpretation of the data.
30

See Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories
of Civil Litigation: Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants
in the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1286-90
(2005).
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The second reason the presence of these large essentially
uncontested case categories is important is that we could be
observing a fall in the reported trial rate simply by virtue of the
growth of the size of this category of non-trial cases. The fact that
this category grew by 50% over the past three decades suggests
that caution should be taken when reading into the C-4 trial rate
evidence any change in the way ordinary litigation is progressing
through the courts over time.
2. Are the Categories of Cases Exhaustive and Mutually
Exclusive?
A second reason why the data reported by the AO are difficult
to interpret is because the coding system used by the AO—which
is designed to accommodate the needs of the management of the
federal courts and not researchers—is not exhaustive with respect
to all the categories of interest to researchers and not mutually
exclusive.
First, the AO has two variables that can be used to identify
“trials”: 1) a “procedural progress” variable that indicates the stage
a case had reached at the time it was terminated, and 2) a
“Disposition” variable that indicates the manner of disposition.
The AO’s C-4 tables are based on the procedural progress variable
and indicate (as is of interest for those who have to manage the
availability of courtrooms and judges) the percentage of cases that
reach the trial stage. If researchers are interested in the question of
whether a case is resolved by adjudication at trial, rather than by
settlement or pre-trial motion, however, we need to look not at the
procedural progress variable but at the disposition variable.
The disposition variable currently includes 20 codes, though
the number has changed over time. Excluding the codes for clearly
non-final terminations (such as transfers, remands and stays), the
codes that are relevant to an investigation of the changing
disposition of cases are:
Disp 2
Disp 3

Dismissed: want of prosecution
Dismissed: lack of jurisdiction

HADFIELD MACROED.DOC

154

4/6/2006 2:31 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Disp 4
Disp 5
Disp 6
Disp 7
Disp 8
Disp 9
Disp 12
Disp 13
Disp 14
Disp 17
Disp 19
Disp 20

Judgment on default
Judgment on consent
Judgment on motion before trial
Jury verdict
Directed verdict
Court trial
Dismissed: voluntary
Dismissed: settled
Dismissed: other
Judgment on other
Judgment on appeal affirmed (magistrate judge)
Judgment on appeal denied (magistrate judge)31

Although this is a lengthy list, it is not an exhaustive list of the
dispositions we would like to distinguish for purposes of exploring,
for example, the question of whether increasing settlement rates or
summary judgment rates account for any drop in trial rates. Notice
first that the code for “Judgment on motion before trial” does not
distinguish among the wide variety of motions that could terminate
a case. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (F.R.C.P.
12(b)(6)), for example, is not distinguished from a motion for
summary judgment. The code for “Dismissed: other” also does not
distinguish between a dismissal for failure to state a claim and
other reasons for dismissal (such as a failure to adhere to required
filing deadlines). Likewise, “judgment on other” does not
distinguish among the “other” reasons for a judgment to be
rendered, such as an order from an appellate court to enter
judgment and a judgment on the pleadings. Similarly, the code for
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction does not distinguish between
dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which are
generally with prejudice, and dismissals for lack of personal
jurisdiction, which are generally without prejudice.32
While the lack of exhaustive categories is significant, the
greater problem facing empirical researchers is the failure of the
31

FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA
BASE, 1970-2000, PART 117: CIVIL TERMINATIONS, 2000, 14-15 (2002).
32
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
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coding system to be mutually exclusive. This is, however, a
problem that only becomes apparent on review of how the coding
system is used in the courts. To review the coding system, I33
conducted thousands of audits of several of the codes for the 2000
data using the internet-accessible PACER system.34 That is, I drew
samples of cases coded, for example, “judgment on motion before
trial,” and then looked at the docket sheet for each case in the
sample to determine whether the case was indeed terminated with
judgment on a motion before trial. What I found is that particular
dispositions were coded in multiple ways.35 Settlements, for
example, were not always coded “Dismissed: settled.” Often they
were coded as “Dismissed: voluntary.” Sometimes they were even
coded as “Dismissed: other” or “Judgment on other.” These are not
obviously wrong codings, from the perspective of the court system
and the goals of judicial management. But the overlapping use of
the codes presents an enormous difficulty to researchers seeking to
identify all the cases that are settled.
The unfortunate implication of the lack of mutually exclusive
coding is that to a large extent empirical researchers lose what is so
valuable about the federal judicial database, namely that it provides
extensive detail on a case-by-case basis. This is the type of data
that is required to perform regression analysis, necessary to test
hypotheses about the potential causes of variation across casetypes, across jurisdictions, among litigant types, and over time in
the disposition of cases. While the audits provide a method of
correcting the data,36 they relegate us to descriptive analysis of the
aggregate patterns in disposition.

33

Together with several research assistants, to whom I am grateful.
I am grateful to the great many judges in the federal district courts who
granted me a waiver of the fees normally charged for access to PACER.
35
For a complete description of these results, see Hadfield, supra note 30.
36
See Gillian Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone?, 1 J. OF
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705 (2004) (providing a method for correcting the
data).
34
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3. How Much Error Is There In the Coding of Cases?

A third source of difficulty in the use of the federal trials data
is the presence of sheer error in the coding of cases. This is more
problematic than admitting that the coding system is not mutually
exclusive and that there are multiple “correct” codes possible for a
settled case, for example. Instead it goes to the basic problem that a
transferred case, for example, can be mis-coded as disposed of by
judgment on a motion before trial. A certain amount of coding
error of this type is expected in any large data set, but the rates of
error in the federal data are relatively high for some codes.37
When we combine the true errors in coding with the errors that
a researcher who interprets the codes to be mutually exclusive will
make, we find some impossibly high rates of error overall:
Disp 6
Disp 7
Disp 9
Disp 12
Disp 13
Disp 14
Disp 17

Judgment on motion before trial
Jury verdict
Court trial
Dismissed: voluntary
Dismissed: settled
Dismissed: other
Judgment on other

20%
8%
12%
50%
6%
65%
50%

The errors shown above are “type 1” errors, that is, cases in
which the true disposition is not the coded disposition, as that
code might be naturally interpreted by a researcher. The error in
the “Dismissed: other” category, for example, reflects that fact
that in 2000, a researcher who relied on this disposition code to
identify dismissals that were neither voluntary, nor settlements,
nor transfers, nor dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, nor stays—
and thus infers that the remaining cases were adjudicated
dismissals—will be wrong 65% of the time. Other errors are
“type 2” errors and are similar to what was described above, in
37

Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Database: An Initial Empirical
Analysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1455 (2003) (documenting the codes in the
federal data used to identify the amounts demanded and awarded).
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which a disposition associated with one code is mis-coded and
thus “hidden” in another code. I found significant numbers of
bench trials, for example, hidden in the codes for “Judgment on
other” and “Dismissed: other.” This has significant implications
for the reliability of claims about the disappearing trial.
4. Are the Codes the Same Over Time?
A final difficulty in using the federal trial data to assess
changes in the disposition of federal cases, and specifically to
answer the question of whether trials are vanishing, is that the
coding system used by the federal courts has changed over time.
Again, this is a standard issue facing researchers working with
time series, and the federal courts are no exception. There are
always tradeoffs to be made in deciding whether to “fix” a coding
system (clearly the critique I offer above suggests some possible
“fixes”) and thereby disrupt the comparability between years.
Prior to 1979, there were no disposition codes for trial
outcomes; only a “Judgment for” code indicating “Judgment for
plaintiff,” “Judgment for defendant,” or “Judgment for both.” This
is why, for comparability going back to the early 1960s, it is only
possible to report the percentage of cases going to trial using the
procedural progress variable.
The most significant change in the disposition codes in the
federal data happened in 1986. During that year, the courts
switched from a coding system with ten codes to one with twenty.
Obviously, this was a significant beneficial gain in terms of the
exhaustiveness of categories. But it presents researchers with the
problem that, even accounting for the errors discussed above, it is
not possible to go back earlier than 1987 to track what happened,
for example, to particular types of dismissals. Prior to 1987, there
were two categories of dismissal: “Dismissed for want of
prosecution,” and “Dismissed, discontinued, settled, withdrawn,
etc.” This lack of continuity limits the ability to assess claims
about longer-term changes in the disposition of federal cases.
The changes in the coding systems also introduce another
problem, which is that the change evidently prompts a spike in
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coding errors, as clerks become accustomed to the new system. In
1986, the disposition code “3” referred to “Dismissed,
discontinued, settled, withdrawn, etc.” In 1987, disposition code
“3” referred to “Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” A review of
the 1987 data appears to indicate that there were a tremendous
number of dismissals for lack of jurisdiction in 1987—clearly a
result of large numbers of cases which were dismissed for any
reason continuing to be coded with a “3.” Over a period of about 5
years, this number settles down to a more believable and relatively
low rate.
B. Making Do With the Data: What We Know
As most of the scientists who deal with courts would attest, the
problems of incomplete, unreliable and inadequate data are hardly
rare. Indeed, much of the skill of analyzing data in a reliable
scientific manner is the skill of teasing out evidence capable of
testing hypotheses from problematic data. The problems in the
federal court data, with which we would like to test hypotheses
about the changing disposition of cases, severely limit what we can
say, even descriptively; but we are not left with nothing to say at
all. And if anything, the inadequacies provide a strong argument
for the need for more and better data about the legal system.
After conducting the audits of the disposition codes in the
federal data, I used these results to estimate the “correct”
percentage of cases in each code for the year 2000. My samples in
the audits were generally large enough, for example, to determine
with some confidence the actual share of settled cases and tried
cases.38 In addition, in order to examine questions about the role
that the type of litigant might play in the disposition of cases, I
coded the case-level data for the type of plaintiff and defendant,
either “individual” or “organization,” and again I audited the
coding system against the PACER docket records.39 I then
38

See Hadfield, supra note 30, at 1281-84 (giving full discussion of this
estimation technique and the others discussed).
39
These types of questions include: Do individual litigants face higher cost
obstacles to going to trial? Do businesses prefer to settle cases in order to benefit
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estimated the correction factors for the disposition codes based on
samples of cases that were drawn separately from the four
casetypes that resulted from the litigant coding I used: individual
versus individual, individual versus organization, organization
versus individual, and organization versus organization. This
allowed me to estimate the percentage of cases disposed of by the
various modes of disposition for each of these four case types.
Table 1, below, shows the results I obtained when I restricted the
population of cases to those that were most like the “ordinary”
civil lawsuit we generally have in mind when assessing the pros
and cons of the vanishing trial. I removed the prisoner and student
loan cases from the population given the risk that these would
distort our picture. I also removed cases that were non-final and
those that were uncontested through either default or abandonment,
that is, cases where there was no real possibility that the case could
have been tried, settled, or disposed on a contested pre-trial
motion. (In the following table, I refer to any final case disposition
other than full trial or settlement as “non-trial adjudication.”)
Table 1: Disposition by Casetype, Final Contested Terminations, Federal Civil Cases 2000

True
Disposition
(percent)
Settlement
Non-Trial
Adjudication

Casetype
I v. I

I v. O

O v. I

O v. O

55.0

53.1

71.6

71.0

34.5

34.5

21.1

22.0

Bench
Decision

5.7

7.3

5.7

5.6

Jury and
Directed
Verdict

4.2

2.6

1.2

1.4

All Trials

9.9

9.9

6.9

7.0

from the confidentiality that can be maintained? Has the overall trial rate
decreased because of a shift to a greater percentage of cases involving
organizational litigants?
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The problems in the data that I have discussed limit my ability
to perform statistical significance tests on these estimates,40 but
there is a good basis nonetheless for confidence in the many
differences shown in Table 1. As we can see, individual and
organizational plaintiffs see significantly different results in their
cases. Individual plaintiffs are much less likely to see their cases
settled than are organizational plaintiffs, in both cases regardless of
whether the defendant is an individual or an organization.
Individual plaintiffs are much more likely to see their cases
adjudicated, with or without a full trial, than are organizational
plaintiffs, again regardless of whether the defendant is an
individual or an organization.
Most importantly, from the perspective of investigating claims
about the vanishing trial we can see first that the trial rate has not
shrunk to zero, or even to 1.8%, as we might conclude from the
original AO C-4 tables.41 In 2000, individual plaintiff cases went to
trial 10% of the time. Comparatively, organizational plaintiff cases
went to trial 7% of the time. Overall, given that individual plaintiff
cases account for approximately 70% of all federal civil cases,42
even after excluding prisoner and student loan cases, the overall
trial rate for federal civil cases was on the order of 9% in 2000.
If we now want to know whether this trial rate—the percentage
of final, contested non-prisoner, non-student loan cases that were
resolved with a trial rather than settlement or non-trial
adjudication—is higher, lower or the same as it was in 1970,
however, we face a true obstacle. The work that was required to
more accurately estimate the 2000 trial rate, as laborious as it was,
is nothing compared to the work that would be required to perform
the same procedures for the 1970 data. To audit the 1970 data for
true disposition and casetype, would require hand-culling dockets
from the files in courthouses across the country, even if we used
(as we could and should) only a sample of districts to estimate the
results for the federal system as a whole.
40

See Hadfield, supra note 30, at 1316-18 (discussing the significance of
the results up to the step prior to the one represented in this table).
41
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
42
See Hadfield, supra note 30, at 1298 (giving these estimates).
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Even without the appropriate data for comparison to 1970,
however, we can see in Table 1 the reason why we need
significantly improved data and investigation into the basic
question of whether the trial rate has changed over time. It is clear
that today the type of litigants in a case, in particular the type of
plaintiff, matters significantly for the disposition of the case.
Moreover, as I discuss more fully in the paper that developed these
estimates, the normative and prescriptive implications of changing
case disposition vary depending on the nature of the litigants: a
drop in public trials may be a concern in cases involving
individuals but not in cases involving organizations only; efforts to
increase settlements may have different effects and may need
different designs depending on the nature of the litigants involved;
and so on.43 Table 1 also raises the possibility—a hypothesis that
needs to be tested—that increased efforts to dispose of cases pretrial, such as heightened standards for surviving a motion for
summary judgment, may not reduce costly expenditures on trials—
they may only reduce the incidence of relatively less expensive
settlement. Additionally, Table 1 also suggests a caution for the
frequent assumption that reduced trial rates must imply reduced
public adjudication and hence precedent creation. In reality, it
appears that much of the difference in settlement rates between
individual plaintiff and organizational plaintiff cases comes not
from differences in the rate of trial but rather from differences in
the rate at which cases are disposed of with non-trial adjudication,
a process that can and does produce precedent. At a minimum,
Table 1 tells us that the phenomena occurring in the federal courts
are complex and in need of much more refined empirical
investigation before we can reach appropriate conclusions about
whether and how judges and courts should change what they do.
CONCLUSION
The investigation of the data underlying the vanishing trial
contains a sobering message for the important questions judges,
43

See id.
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lawyers, and policy makers have about the relationship between
science and law. Even with respect to the much less refined, purely
descriptive, question of whether cases are more or less likely to go
to trial today than they were in 1970, our knowledge is painfully
slim. This is especially true once we subject our claims to the same
types of rigorous standards we require of the scientists and sciencebased decisions the legal system regulates. Answering the hard
questions of whether Daubert hearings are weeding out too many
or too few cases, whether the cost of science-based litigation is
hobbling scientific investigation, whether corporations are
resorting to secret settlements to such an extent as to reduce the
deterrence effect of law, and so on, require us to press far beyond
the limits of what we reliably can say—on the basis of data and
proper inference, not anecdote and personal experience—about
what is happening in our courtrooms and law offices.
Indeed, the work on the vanishing trial question that I have
conducted cautions in particular against the risks we face of
misunderstanding the legal system if we look only to personal
experience. Table 1 showed that what is happening to the trial in
federal courtrooms—how many cases are settling, how many are
being disposed of with non-trial adjudication, how many are
ultimately going to trial—depends significantly on the type of
litigants involved, whether individual or organizational. We know
from other empirical work, specifically the careful studies of
Chicago lawyers reported in the 1982 book Chicago Lawyers and
the recent Urban Lawyers, that the lawyers who represent
organizations are not generally the same lawyers who represent
individuals.44 Moreover, the lawyers who represent organizations
tend to have greater prestige and influence in the legal profession.
We need to be careful, then, to remember that particular lawyers—
participating in ABA committees, for example, or contributing to
conferences discussing the state of the legal system—will have
personal experiences (of never getting to trial, settling more often
or facing greater difficulty surviving summary judgment, for
example) that are reflective of the particular type of clients they
44

See HEINZ, supra note 24; JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN,
CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982).
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represent. The data we do have should warn us against the
reliability of a generalization from personal experience that does
not take into account the differences among clients, and among
lawyers. Similar differences could be found, I suspect, if we
looked to the mix of casetypes that show up in courtrooms in
different parts of the country. This would suggest a caution to
judges about generalizing from personal experience and should
spur the call for more and better data on which we can reliably
base our understanding of how our legal system operates.
The importance of the issues of how law regulates science,
then, demands that law become more scientific itself. This requires
that those in the legal system, including lawyers, judges, legal
scholars and policymakers, understand the need for vastly
increased efforts to collect data about the legal system.
Institutionally, the legal system needs to develop a “public health”
attitude towards itself, and find ways, as the medical community
has, to protect confidentiality for clients without treating
everything that happens in the legal system as a strictly private
matter. Just as the information doctors gain from documenting
what happens to a patient who comes into a hospital for treatment
is ultimately essential for the progress of medicine, so too is the
information gained by lawyers, judges and courts from evaluating,
litigating, settling and adjudicating cases essential for the progress
of law.

